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  April 17, 2020

  Boeing Expected To Follow Airbus Production Cuts

  Guy Norris Jens Flottau Michael Bruno Sean Broderick April 17, 2020 Aviation Week and Space technology Just a short time ago, Airbus could not expand fast enough. Given the strength of demand, the manufacturer planned to add another final assembly line for narrowbodies in Toulouse, even though its global industrial system was already complex — because maximum deliveries were what mattered. Now, as aircraft manufacturers begin to assess the medium- and longer-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Toulouse project and many others- are on hold or at least substantially slowed down. And if the revised projections for future aircraft deliveries are only roughly accurate, that additional assembly line will not be needed for a very long time. Airbus in early April became the first OEM to announce new production targets, around one-third below previous assumptions. At this stage, trying to figure out aircraft demand and future production rates is a matter of likelihoods and scenarios covering a wide range of outcomes. In many cases, the most optimistic scenarios already look outdated, leaving those indicating a deeper and more lasting impact on the table — a grim outlook for Airbus, Boeing, Embraer and their suppliers. Consultancy Roland Berger has attempted to define three possible outcomes. Its “rebound” scenario is modeled around two months of air travel restrictions, a full recovery to a precrisis air travel level by next winter and a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.6% thereafter. In that case, OEMs would lose only 790 deliveries over 10 years vis-a-vis the precrisis outlook. It is already clear that the short term will be much worse, although a steep recovery in later years remains a possibility. If restrictions stay in place for four months, the new normal would be at 90% of precrisis levels and would be reached in the summer of 2021. Airlines would defer aircraft replacement for 18 months and future growth rates average 4.1%. Under this “delayed cure” scenario, the industry would lose almost 6,000 deliveries between now and 2030. Unfortunately, the worst Roland Berger scenario may now be the most likely, at least in its short-term elements: Six months of severe travel restrictions, demand recovery to only 80% by the summer of 2022, extended deferrals and lower growth for the long term at 3.6%. In that circumstance, airlines would accept 10,460 fewer aircraft over the next 10 years. For context: Airbus delivered 863 aircraft in 2019, and Boeing sent out 380 (affected by the 737 MAX grounding). In 2019, Boeing led with 806 deliveries, and Airbus handed over 800 aircraft. If the worst-case scenario comes to pass, the industry will deliver only 11,280 aircraft in the next 10 years; the more positive assumptions of the “delayed cure” model leave that number at 15,840. This would essentially put the industry—on average and very roughly—at the 2017 delivery levels of a combined 1,600 commercial jets above 100 seats for Airbus (now including the A220), Boeing and Embraer. Of course, new players such as Mitsubishi's SpaceJet, the Comac C919 and the United Aircraft Corp. MC-21 will fill (small) amounts of the demand as well. Airbus' decision to cut production by one-third would, if continued, leave it with around 570 annual deliveries, close to 2011 levels. CEO Guillaume Faury points out that it is “not unlikely” that the new rates could go back up in 2021 as the situation improves, but he says it is too early to make firm commitments. The decisions made now reflect the “best knowledge” today and “many conversations with airline CEOs and [chief operating officers].” The production reduction will be implemented over the coming weeks. “This crisis will probably be a long one,” says Faury. “Our industry is one of the most impacted. . . . [The production rates are] the result of the best matching between the downturn and the remaining commitments. We needed to have a plan. We will review it probably on a monthly basis.” The manufacturer plans to produce 40 A320neo-family aircraft per month on average, down from a previous near-term target of 63 and a planned increase to 67 or more. Airbus will also reduce A330/A330neo output to two aircraft per month from the precrisis production level of 3.5. A350 deliveries are being reduced from 9-10 aircraft per month to just six. Airbus delivered 122 aircraft in the first quarter, 36 of them in March. That month included two A220s, 19 A320neos, one A321ceo, 10 A321neos, one A330-200 and three A350s, according to the company's latest order and delivery figures. Airbus produced 60 more aircraft that were not delivered in the quarter because customers said they were unable to accept them. The A330 will remain a profitable program, says Faury, but the A350 will face “more headwinds,” having just moved into profitability in 2019. Boeing's recently updated commercial airliner figures for 2020 through March reveal dramatic cuts in orders and deliveries as the air transport market continues to nosedive in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. The beleaguered company, which is due to release its first-quarter financial results on April 29, saw net orders for the year plummet by 307 aircraft, putting it on track for its worst period since the mid-1990s. Despite picking up 24 new orders for the 787 and two additional 767 orders, the bulk of the damage was caused by losses to the 737 MAX orderbook. According to many financial analysts, Airbus' rate cuts set a floor for similar action by Boeing. “We believe similar cuts from Boeing are likely,” Ken Herbert of Canaccord Genuity said April 14. His team assumes MAX deliveries will not restart until at least the third quarter, with just 36 to be delivered this year. It will take “several quarters” for MAX new order activity to pick up. Production next year could average 21 new narrowbodies monthly, and perhaps around 40 per month by the end of 2022. But some of that depends on how much government aid and commercial-sector funding Boeing ultimately receives. “We believe the updated production forecasts are alarming, but not surprising,” Herbert added. “The coronavirus is likely to become a significantly greater pressure point on Boeing than the long-running 737 MAX crisis,” says Jonathan Root, Moody's Investors Service senior vice president and lead analyst. “We now estimate external funding needs in 2020 to at least double—to $30 billion—compared to our precoronavirus expectations,” he says. Boeing already funded about half of this need with the $13.8 billion delayed-draw term loan facility arranged in February and drawn down by mid-March. In the long term, Root's team does not envisage a return to 2019 delivery numbers before the end of 2022. Many other analysts such as Herbert and consultants such as Roland Berger's group agree. Grounded since March 2019 following two accidents, the 737 MAX lost a further 150 orders in March 2020, half of which were cancellations from aircraft lessor Avolon. Other operators included Brazilian carrier Gol, which cut 34 aircraft from the backlog as part of a compensation deal for nondelivery of 25 MAXs in 2019. Overall, net 737 orders for the first quarter have been reduced by 314 aircraft, some 173 of which are listed as cancellations or conversions to other models, and another 141 lost because they no longer meet Boeing's firm contract revenue accounting standard. Deliveries were also significantly down. Just 50 aircraft of all models were delivered through March 31, representing the lowest number of quarterly deliveries since the end of 2008. By comparison, Boeing delivered 149 aircraft in the same period in 2019, and 184 were handed over to customers in the first quarter of 2018. The falloff in deliveries primarily reflects the continuing impact of the 737 MAX grounding, which last year more than halved the company's overall delivery target. Boeing says delivery numbers have been also affected by logistical challenges, as some operators have been unable to bring flight crews to the U.S. to accept the new aircraft owing to travel restrictions. The restrictions are also hampering the MAX's return-to-service effort. The final FAA certification flight to put the software through its paces, the next major step in the return-to-service process, has not taken place. The subsequent milestone, work by the Joint Operational Evaluation Board (JOEB), a multiregulatory group that will evaluate the MAX training recommendations in simulator sessions, has not been scheduled and is not likely to happen until international travel restrictions are eased. The MAX will not be approved for service until the JOEB's work, including a written report, is done. Boeing has not wavered from its projection that a mid-2020 FAA approval is in the cards, but the lack of progress on key milestones makes this increasingly unlikely. In 2019, Boeing completed the year with 380 deliveries, 127 of which were 737s and 158 787s. The previous year, with production of the MAX ramping up and manufacture of the final 737NGs still being phased out, the single-aisle models accounted for 580 of the record-breaking 806 deliveries the company racked up for the year. Military deliveries accounted for eight of the 50 (five KC-46A/767-derivative tankers and three P-8A maritime patrol 737NG derivatives), while the 787 contributed to the bulk of the tally with 29 aircraft. Boeing has meanwhile announced it will begin a phased return to production of commercial aircraft models—including the 737MAX—at its Puget Sound, Washington, and South Carolina plants starting as early as April 20 after suspending activity on March 25 due to the COVID-19 outbreak. It is, however, widely expected to announce rate reductions for the 737, 777 and 787 shortly after manufacturing resumes. The adjusted numbers, using Boeing's own accounting standards on firm contracts, now show the overall firm backlog for all models has been reduced to 5,049—4,079 of those are for the 737. The 747-8F backlog is now reduced to 13, while the 777 orderbook has shrunk to 356 and the 787 to 515. Business aviation fares no better than civil, with an expectation that the business jet market will see deteriorating demand. “Though we expect demand for smaller and midsize jets will see a greater decline in demand than larger jets, there will still be a negative impact to the large-cabin segment that includes Bombardier's Global family,” Moody's analysts say. In turn, credit rating agencies such as Moody's, S&P Global Ratings and Fitch Ratings are downgrading debt rankings of OEMs and suppliers across the board. “The downgrades reflect Moody's expectation that 2020 will be a very challenging year for commercial aerospace suppliers, with double--digit earnings declines stemming from a significant reduction in commercial aerospace production by Tier 1 OEMs and suppliers,” the Moody's analysts say. “Stress on the supply chain will result in unprecedented deterioration in earnings and cash flows, resulting in key credit metrics that will remain strained for some time.” “Many suppliers are distressed,” Spirit AeroSystems said in a regulatory filing.

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  December 17, 2020

  L'US Army développe un concept innovant de collaboration drones – robots

  Afin d'accroître l'endurance et la portée de ses drones, l'US Army entend faire collaborer des essaims aériens et terrestres. Des robots pour recharger des drones. L'US Army se penche actuellement sur un concept innovant visant à faire collaborer drones et robots et ainsi accroître les performances de ses essaims de drones. Afin de pouvoir augmenter les capacités des drones déployés au sein de l'essaim, ces derniers se rendront au sol et se poseront sur des robots, qui leur serviront de plateformes de chargement. Une idée astucieuse afin de considérablement augmenter la portée et l'endurance de ces petits aéronefs. Algorithmes et intelligence artificielle. Afin de conduire ce projet, le laboratoire de recherche de l'US Army a notifié à l'université d'Illinois un accord portant sur 4 ans et un budget de recherche de 8M$. L'enjeu est notamment de pouvoir définir une intelligence artificielle assez performante afin que les drones puissent se poser en toute sécurité sur les robots au sol, et que ces derniers parviennent à suivre les aéronefs en vol. Néanmoins, de nombreux aspects sont à prendre en compte eut égard à l'environnement opérationnel dans lequel ces drones seront déployés. Ils devront conserver leur discrétion, tout en évitant les potentiels obstacles, puisque toute la manœuvre sera réalisée de façon automatique. L'aspect essaim sera également à gérer car l'ambition est de pouvoir mener une mission en continu. Il faudra donc faire alterner les drones dans les phases de chargement afin qu'il n'y ait pas d'interruption de missions. Libérer la charge mentale du soldat. A travers ce projet, l'objectif est également de soulager les soldats, aussi bien d'un point de vue opérationnel que logistique. Les militaires n'auront plus à se charger du pilotage du drone ni à gérer le niveau et le remplacement des batteries. L'ensemble se fera automatiquement et permettra aux opérationnels de se concentrer sur des t'ches à haute valeur ajoutée. https://www.air-cosmos.com/article/lus-army-dveloppe-un-concept-innovant-de-collaboration-drones-robots-23979

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  April 16, 2020

  Technology alliances will help shape our post-pandemic future

  Martijn Rasser There's no question the post-corona world will be very different. How it will look depends on actions the world's leaders take. Decisions made in coming months will determine whether we see a renewed commitment to a rules-based international order, or a fragmented world increasingly dominated by authoritarianism. Whomever steps up to lead will drive the outcome. China seeks the mantle of global leadership. Beijing is exploiting the global leadership vacuum, the fissures between the United States and its allies, and the growing strain on European unity. The Chinese Communist Party has aggressively pushed a narrative of acting swiftly and decisively to contain the virus, building goodwill through ‘mask diplomacy', and sowing doubts about the virus' origin to deflect blame for the magnitude of the crisis and to rewrite history. Even though the results so far are mixed, the absence of the United States on the global stage provides Beijing with good momentum. Before the pandemic, the world's democracies already faced their gravest challenge in decades: the shift of economic power to illiberal states. By late 2019, autocratic regimes accounted for a larger share of global GDP than democracies for the first time since 1900. As former U.K. foreign secretary David Miliband recently observed, “liberal democracy is in retreat.” How the United States and like-minded partners respond post-pandemic will determine if that trend holds. There is urgency to act — the problem is now even more acute. The countries that figure out how to quickly restart and rebuild their economies post-pandemic will set the course for the 21st century. It is not only economic heft that is of concern: political power and military might go hand in hand with economic dominance. At the center of this geostrategic and economic competition are technologies — artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and 5G — that will be the backbone of the 21st century economy. Leadership and ongoing innovation in these areas will confer critical economic, political, and military power, and the opportunity to shape global norms and values. The pre-crisis trajectory of waning clout in technology development, standards-setting, and proliferation posed an unacceptable and avoidable challenge to the interests of the world's leading liberal-democratic states. The current crisis accentuates this even more: it lays bare the need to rethink and restructure global supply chains; the imperative of ensuring telecommunication networks are secure, robust, and resilient; the ability to surge production of critical materiel, and the need to deter and counteract destructive disinformation. This is difficult and costly — and it is best done in concert. Bold action is needed to set a new course that enhances the ability of the world's democracies to out-compete increasingly capable illiberal states. The growing clout of authoritarian regimes is not rooted in better strategy or more effective statecraft. Rather, it lies in the fractious and complacent nature of the world's democracies and leading technology powers. In response, a new multilateral effort — an alliance framework — is needed to reverse these trends. The world's technology and democracy leaders — the G7 members and countries like Australia, the Netherlands, and South Korea — should join forces to tackle matters of technology policy. The purpose of this initiative is three-fold: one, regain the initiative in the global technology competition through strengthened cooperation between like-minded countries; two, protect and preserve key areas of competitive technological advantage; and three, promote collective norms and values around the use of emerging technologies. Such cooperation is vital to effectively deal with the hardest geopolitical issues that increasingly center on technology, from competing economically to building deterrence to combating disinformation. This group should not be an exclusive club: it should also work with countries like Finland and Sweden to align policies on telecommunications; Estonia, Israel, and New Zealand for cyber issues; and states around the world to craft efforts to counter the proliferation of Chinese surveillance technology and offer sound alternatives to infrastructure development, raw material extraction, and loans from China that erode their sovereignty. The spectrum of scale and ambition this alliance can tackle is broad. Better information sharing would yield benefits on matters like investment screening, counterespionage, and fighting disinformation. Investments in new semiconductor fabs could create more secure and diverse supply chains. A concerted effort to promote open architecture in 5G could usher in a paradigm shift for an entire industry. Collaboration will also be essential to avoiding another pandemic calamity. Similar ideas are percolating among current and former government leaders in capitals such as Tokyo, Berlin, London, and Washington, with thought leaders like Jared Cohen and Anja Manuel, and in think tanks around the world. The task at hand is to collate these ideas, find the common ground, and devise an executable plan. This requires tackling issues like organizational structure, governance, and institutionalization. It also requires making sure that stakeholders from government, industry, and civil society from around the world provide input to make the alliance framework realistic and successful. No one country can expect to achieve its full potential by going it alone, not even the United States. An alliance framework for technology policy is the best way to ensure that the world's democracies can effectively compete economically, politically, and militarily in the 21st century. The links between the world's leading democracies remain strong despite the challenges of the current crisis. These relationships are an enduring and critical advantage that no autocratic country can match. It is time to capitalize on these strengths, retake the initiative, and shape the post-corona world. Martijn Rasser is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/04/14/technology-alliances-will-help-shape-our-post-pandemic-future/